percent. Despite the efforts of subsequent research (e.g., Abel, 1999) to bridge this gap by offering various adaptations to the original model, there remains a concern that the Ibbotson estimate may simply be too high, and thus serve as an unreasonable target for theorists to explain (see Kocherlakota 1996 , Siegel and Thaler, 1997 , and Cochrane 1997 for summaries).
Evidence from the investment community also suggests that many investors believe the equity premium is less than 8%. Survey evidence (e.g., Benore, 1983) indicates that investors use equity premium estimates that are below 5%. Analysis of the discount rates used in the discounted cash flow valuations provided in analyst research reports also suggests that the equity premium is below 5%. In essence, unreasonably optimistic future projections are required to justify current valuations if firm-specific discount rates are based on an 8% equity premium.
1 In recent years, some even go so far as to recommend that the premium is no more than one or two percent (e.g., Glassman and Hassett, 1998, and Wien, 1998) .
It should be noted that the historic evidence is not uniformly consistent with the Ibbotson estimate. Examination of sample periods different from that considered by Ibbotson suggests lower values for the equity premium. Siegel (1992) finds that the excess of observed annual returns for NYSE stocks over short-term government bonds was 0.6 percent, 3.5 percent, and 5.9 percent over the periods 1802 -1970 , 1871 -1925 and 1926 -1990 . Blanchard (1993 uses historical data and forecasts to examine subperiods within the 1926-1991 period, and concludes that the equity risk premium is as low as two or three percent by the early 1990s. This evidence is consistent with US stocks being unusually lucky in the years since 1926.
Historic evidence from other equity markets also supports this view. Other equity markets can be used to supplement the US evidence if those markets are of similar risk to that of US equities, with any across-market differences in the risk aversion of the representative investor being mitigated by the movement of equity capital across markets. Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) examine the historic evidence for 39 equity markets going back to the 1920s, and conclude that 1 This implied optimism is most evident when examining mature, low-growth firms.
the high equity premium observed in the US during that period appears to be the exception rather than the rule. Consideration of the performance of other markets raises the possibility that the US evidence is tainted by survivor bias: some stock markets collapsed and those markets that survived, like the US exchanges, exhibit better performance than expected (see Brown, Goetzman, and Ross, 1995) .
The most important reason to suspect that the Ibbotson estimate might be too high is the emerging consensus that the equity premium varies through time. Not only does such variation call into question the benefits of historic evidence, it could actually bias upward the estimate.
Specifically, an overall decline in the equity premium since 1927 would cause observed returns to exceed expectations during this period. Support for such a decline, especially since the early 1980s, is provided in Blanchard (1993) , and appears to be caused by a simultaneous decline in expected real rates of return on stocks and an increase in expected real risk-free rates.
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Partially in response to these limitations of using observed returns, financial economists have explored an ex ante approach that estimates the equity premium using forecasted dividends.
Informally, expected rates of return on the market equal dividend yields plus expected growth in dividends. A formal statement of the dividend growth approach, based on Gordon (1962) , is provided in equation (1). The Gordon growth model is a special case of the general Williams 
where p 0 = current price, at the end of year 0, 2 This increase in expected real risk-free rates is another puzzle, but that puzzle is beyond the focus of this paper.
d t = dividends expected at the end of future year t, k * = expected rate of return on the market, derived from the dividend growth model, and g = expected dividend growth rate, in perpetuity.
Strictly speaking, k* is a non-stochastic discount rate or internal rate of return, not an expected rate of return, which is likely to be stochastic (Samuelson, 1965) . Expected rates of return differ from discount rates when they are stochastic, and that difference increases with the variance of the expected rate of return. With no easy way to convert discount rates to expected rates of return, the literature has assumed implicitly that the expected rate of return is nonstochastic and has used it interchangeably with the discount rate.
While the dividend yield is easily measured, g is harder to identify. Proxies used for g include past growth in earnings, dividends, or economy-wide aggregates (such as GDP).
Unfortunately, as explained in the Appendix, the dividend growth rate that can be sustained in perpetuity is a hypothetical rate that is not necessarily anchored in any observable series, leaving considerable room for disagreement about the best proxy.
One solution is to assume that forecasted earnings growth rates proxy for dividend growth rates in perpetuity. In addition to providing buy/sell recommendations, sell-side analysts also provide earnings forecasts, which often include a forecasted growth in earnings that is expected to persist over the next five years (hereafter labeled g 5 ). While most of the studies using g 5 as a proxy for g have focused on the US market alone (e.g, Brigham, Shome and Vinson, 1985, and , some have examined other major equity markets also (e.g., Khorana, Moyer and Patel, 1997) .
Estimates of the equity premium, based on the assumption that g 5 equals g, are similar in magnitude to the Ibbotson estimate derived from historical data. For example, Moyer and Patel (1997) estimate the equity premium each year over their 11-year sample period (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) and generate a mean estimate of 9.38 (6.96) percent relative to the 1-year (30-year) risk-free rate.
However, others have balked at using g 5 as a proxy for g, because it appears unreasonably high at an intuitive level (e.g, Malkiel, 1996) . Stepping down the assumed dividend growth in perpetuity results in lower equity premium estimates.
While we show that g 5 is systematically optimistic, obtaining an unbiased estimate is not easy because the level of optimism varies across countries and over time. Not only is it difficult to infer the level of systematic optimism from the relatively short time-series of forecast errors available (reliable data on analyst forecasts go back only about 20 years), the incentives for analysts to make optimistic forecasts vary across the sample. For example, the literature on US analysts' forecasts suggests that while analysts tended to make optimistic forecasts early in our sample period to curry favor with management, more recently management has tended to guide analyst forecasts downward to be able to beat them when announcing earnings. Thus, the use of g 5 as a proxy for g generates disagreement, similar to the case when proxies for g are obtained from observed growth rates.
We use a different approach, labeled the abnormal earnings model, to mitigate some of the problems mentioned so far. 3 Recognizing that dividends equal earnings less changes in accounting (or book) values of equity, allows the stream of future dividends projected in equation (2) to be replaced by the current book value of equity plus a function of future accounting earnings (details follow in section I). Being an ex ante approach, unrepresentative sample periods and time-variation in the equity premium are no longer of concern. Although it is isomorphic to the dividend present value model, the abnormal earnings approach uses other information that is currently available to reduce the importance of assumed growth rates, and is able to narrow considerably the range of allowable growth rates by focusing on growth in rents (abnormal earnings), rather than dividends.
Section II contains a description of our sample of IBES forecasts and our methodology.
We report in Section III our estimates of the market discount rate for each year between 1985
3
The approach appears to have been discovered independently by a number of economists and accountants over the years. Preinreich (1938) is the first cite, to our knowledge. Edwards and Bell (1961) is a later cite. More recently, a large body of analytical and empirical work has utilized this insight (e.g., Penman, 1999) . Examples of questions addressed by empirical investigation include market myopia (Abarbanell/Bernard, 1995) and market inefficiency (Frankel/Lee, 1998a and 1998b) .
and 1998 (inclusive), using both the abnormal earnings and dividend growth approaches. We then subtract the corresponding 10-year risk-free rates for each country-year to generate equity premium estimates. 4 The mean equity premium estimates for the abnormal earnings approach are approximately 3% for Canada, France, UK and US, and are even lower for Germany and Japan.
In contrast, the mean equity premium estimates for the dividend growth approach based on analysts' five-year earnings growth rates are much higher for all six markets, and lie between 6% and 8%.
Notwithstanding potential shortcomings associated with the dividend growth model, we find it convenient to generate estimates using that approach, based on the assumption that g equals g 5 . In addition to being a popular approach, the dividend growth model generates equity premium estimates that resemble the historical Ibbotson estimate. That is, if the equity premium is as high as 8%, market expectations of future dividends must equal the projections implied by the dividend growth approach. In effect, we are able to check on the Ibbotson estimate by examining the projections underlying the dividend growth approach.
Despite considerable variation in expected growth rates across markets and over time,
observing that every one of the approximately seventy estimates based on abnormal earnings lies well below 8% suggests strongly that that number is too high for our sample period. Examination of various diagnostics such as implied values of profitability, price-to-book ratios, and priceearnings ratios for future years for both our approach and the dividend growth approach confirms that an equity premium as high as 8% results in projections that are unreasonable and inconsistent with past experience. The results of that and other sensitivity analyses are reported in section IV.
If the equity premium is indeed as low as our estimates suggest, there are important implications. First, expected or required rates of return (for capital budgeting, regulated industries, and other investment decisions) that are based on the Ibbotson estimate are likely to 4 A discussion of the appropriate maturity for risk-free rates is provided in section II.
be too high. Second, our lower equity premium estimates reduce substantially the spread between the required rates of returns for high and low beta firms, suggesting that less effort need be invested in accurately determining betas associated with investments. Relatedly, explanations of market anomalies based on mismeasured changes in beta need to allow for much larger beta changes to explain observed abnormal returns. Finally, reducing the magnitude of the equity premium puzzle to be explained, to less than half the amount noted in the literature, might invigorate the search for alternative theoretical explanations.
I. Model description.
The relation described in equation (3) below is used to relate expected dividends to forecast earnings, and that allows a conversion of the present value of dividends relation in equation (2) to the abnormal earnings relation in equation (4). 
where e t = earnings forecast for year t, bv t = expected book (or accounting) value of equity at the end of year t, ae t = e t -k(bv t-1 ), is expected abnormal earnings for year t, or accounting earnings less a charge for the cost of equity, and k=expected rate of return on the market portfolio, derived from the abnormal earnings approach.
Equation (4) indicates that the current stock price equals the current book value of equity plus the present value of future expected abnormal earnings. Abnormal earnings, a proxy for economic profits or rents, adjusts reported earnings by deducting a charge for the use of equity capital. Note that the market discount rates estimated from the abnormal earnings and dividend growth approaches are labeled differently: k and k*.
Since the IBES database provides analysts' earnings forecasts only for years 1 through 5, we assume that abnormal earnings grow at a constant rate (g ae ) after year 5, to incorporate dates past that horizon. Equation (4) 
The last, bracketed term captures the present value of abnormal earnings after year 5, and the terms before are derived from accounting statements (bv 0 ) and analyst forecasts (e 1 to e 5 ).
Note that there are three separate growth rates in this paper, and the different growth rates refer to different streams, correspond to different periods, and arise from different sources: g refers to dividends, corresponds to growth in perpetuity, and is assumed by the researcher; g 5 refers to accounting earnings, corresponds to the first five years, and is provided by financial analysts; and g ae refers to abnormal earnings, corresponds to the period beyond year +5, and is assumed by the researcher.
Financial economists have often expressed concerns about accounting earnings deviating from "true" earnings (and book values of equity deviating from market values), in the sense that accounting numbers are noisy and easily manipulated. However, the relations above are not impaired by differences between accounting and economic numbers, nor are they affected by the latitude available within accounting rules to report different accounting numbers.
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While the abnormal earnings stream in equation (4) is equivalent to the corresponding dividend stream in equation (2), the abnormal earnings relation in equation (5) A simple example might help to illustrate this important feature of the abnormal earnings approach. Suppose a manager chooses not to depreciate in year 1, in order to increase reported accounting earnings. While this would increase e 1 and ae 1 , it would also increase bv 1 , the book value of equity at the end of year 1. Inflating this number, which is the investment base for year 2, reduces the value of ae 2 because of the higher charge for the cost of equity in year 2 (k times bv 1 ). This effect reduces all future period abnormal earnings as long as the book value is inflated. There is also a reduction in earnings at some future date because of the depreciation not taken in year 1. It turns out that the increase in ae 1 caused by not depreciating in year 1 is exactly offset by the reduction in the present value of future years' abnormal earnings.
(5) is fixed by numbers that are currently available and do not need to be assumed by the researcher (current book value and abnormal earnings for years +1 through +5). Reducing the fraction of value determined by assumed growth rates results in more reliable market discount rate estimates from the abnormal earnings approach.
Second, in contrast to the potential for disagreement about a reasonable range for g, the rate at which rents can grow in perpetuity after year +5, g ae , is less abstract and easier to gauge using economic intuition. For example, to obtain equity premia around 8%, rents at the market level would have to grow forever at about 15 percent on average. Factors such as anti-trust actions, global competition, and pressure from other stakeholders suggest that the market is unlikely to expect rents to equityholders to grow at such high rates in perpetuity.
Third, future streams for a number of value-relevant indicators (such as P/B, P/E, and ROE) can also be projected under the abnormal earnings approach. This allows one to paint a more complete picture of the future for different assumed growth rates. Analysis of the levels of future profitability (excess of ROE over k) implied by growth rates required to obtain equity premium estimates around 8% also appear inconsistent with past experience.
II. Data and methodology
IBES collects forecasts for different horizons (1-quarter ahead, 1-year ahead, 2-years ahead and so on). At the annual level, most analysts make forecasts for 1 and 2 years ahead and also provide an expected growth rate for earnings that they expect for the next "cycle". Although the duration of such cycles is not explicitly specified, it is informally interpreted to represent the next 5 years. Consequently, we use the forecasted 5-year earnings growth rate (g 5 ) to generate earnings forecasts for years +3, +4, and +5. In some cases, earnings forecasts are available for years +3, +4, and +5, and do not need to be inferred using g 5 .
shares. Book values of equity as of the end of year 0 are collected from Compustat and Global
Vantage for Canada and the US, and from Datastream for all remaining countries.
We considered potential sources of measurement error in the forecasts, other than the optimism bias noted earlier, but are confident that any biases created by these errors are unlikely to alter our equity premium estimates much. For example, in Germany, earnings could be computed in as many as four different ways: GAAP per International Accounting Standards, German GAAP, DVFA and US GAAP.
7 IBES employees indicated that they have been more successful at achieving consistency in recent years (all forecasts are on a DVFA basis), but they are not as certain about earlier years in their database. While differences in basis between forecast and actual items would affect our estimates of analyst bias (forecast versus actual numbers) described in section III, they do not affect our estimates of market discount rates.
Differences in basis across analysts contaminate the consensus numbers used, but the estimated market discount rates are relatively insensitive to changes in the near-term forecasts used.
To select the month of analysis, we first identified the most popular fiscal year-end in each country. For our sample of countries, December was the most popular fiscal year-end for all countries except for Japan, where it was March. Then we identified the period after the fiscal year-end by which annual earnings are required to be disclosed. 8 This period differs across countries (see Table 1 in Alford et al., 1993) : it is 3 months for Japan and the US, 4 months for France, 6 months for Canada and the UK, and 8 months for Germany. We selected the month following the reporting deadline as the "sure to be disclosed" month to collect forecasts for any given year. For example, we collect forecasts as of April each year for the US market, since most firms have December year-ends and the financial statements of these firms should be filed by the end of March.
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The German financial analyst society, Deutsche Vereinigung fur Finanzanalyse (DVFA), has developed a system used by analysts (and often by firms) to adjust reported earnings data to provide a measure that is closer to permanent or core earnings. The adjustment process uses both reported financial information as well as firms' internal records. GAAP refers to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles or the accounting rules under which financial statements are prepared in different domiciles.
For the risk-free rate, we used the l0-year Treasury bond rate, as of the first day of the specified month for each country/year, as provided by Datastream. While short-term rates are appropriate when examining observed returns, long-term yields are more relevant for ex ante computations, since the flows being discounted extend for many years into the future (Ibbotson Associates, 1999) . The 10-year rate was the longest maturity for which data could be obtained from Datastream for all country-years in our sample. Given the general upward sloping term structure for our country-years, the 10-year rate was lower than the 30-year rate and higher than the short-term rate. Therefore, to compare our equity premium estimates with other estimates that are based on risk-free rates of different maturity, one should add to it the mean difference between 10-year yields and the corresponding long or short-term yields during our sample period for that country.
Firm-years included in the sample have forecasts for years +1 and +2, and a 5-year growth, as well as non-missing data for actual book value, earnings, dividends, price per share, and number of shares. Years before 1985 in the IBES database provided insufficient firms to represent the overall market. From 1985 onwards, the number of firms that satisfied the data requirements increased substantially. To include a country-year in our sample, we required that the total market value of all firms in our sample exceed 35 percent of the market value of "primary stock holdings" for that country, as defined by Datastream. Although we used a relatively low hurdle to ensure that our sample contained a block of contiguous years for all countries, for most country-years a substantially greater proportion of the Datastream Market Index than the 35 percent minimum hurdle is represented in our sample. Table I provides information on the number of firms included for the different years in our sample period. The number of years with sufficient firms to represent the overall market was highest for Canada and the US (all 14 years between 1985 and 1998), and lowest for Japan (8 years). While many publicly-traded firms are excluded from our sample, most excluded firms are of low market capitalization. Overall, we believe our samples are fairly representative of the value-weighted market in each country. Book values for years +2 through +5 are estimated in a similar manner. These future book values are used to convert forecasted earnings to abnormal earnings for years +1 through +5, using the relation ae t = e t -k(bv t-1) .
For years beyond year +5, abnormal earnings are assumed to grow at a constant rate, g ae .
We assume that g ae equals the expected inflation rate (see the appendix for additional discussion). Rather than use long-term inflation forecasts, we infer the inflation rate by subtracting three percent from the prevailing risk-free rate, where the three percent represents the real risk-free rate. 10 In effect, we assume that abnormal earnings beyond year +5 exhibit zero growth in real terms. To ensure that our results are not driven by the particular value of g ae selected, we examine the sensitivity of the estimated market discount rate to variation in g ae , and
compute various diagnostics to confirm that our estimates are reasonable (see section IV).
III. Results
Table III provides the annual results from equations (5) and (1). Panels A through F report for Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US, respectively, the 10-year risk 9
Varying the payout ratio has little impact on the estimated discount rate (results available upon request). While a higher (lower) payout ratio reduces (increases) the estimated future book values and increases (decreases) estimated future abnormal earnings, the net impact on estimated discount rates is negligible. 10 Although estimates of the real risk-free rate vary through time, and have historically been lower than three percent, more recently, the excess of the long-term risk-free rate over inflation forecasts has risen to 3 or 4% (e.g., Blanchard (1993) and Siegel's discussion) For the few years where r f in Japan is below 3%, we set g ae =0.
free rates, the two underlying growth rates (g ae and g 5 ), estimates for the two discount rates (k and k*) 11 , and the two equity premium values obtained by subtracting the prevailing risk-free rate. The mean and standard deviations for these estimates over the different years in each country are reported at the bottom of each panel.
The mean equity premium estimates from the abnormal earnings model (k-r f ) are 2.23%, 2.60%, 2.02%, 0.21%, 2.81%, and 3.40%, for Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US, respectively, and the corresponding estimates from the dividend growth model with g assumed to equal g 5 (k*-r f ) are 5.89%, 7.90%, 6.58%, 5.83%, 7.91%, and 7.34%. 12 While the latter estimates are just below the historical Ibbotson estimate, the former are substantially lower for every country-year considered. Despite considerable variation in the circumstances surrounding each country-year, most of the equity premium estimates from the abnormal earnings approach lie in a narrow band between 2 and 4 percent (except for some years in Japan and Germany that are even lower), and none of the approximately 70 equity premium estimates exceed 5 percent. We confirm that betas for the six markets are reasonably similar, thereby allowing comparison of equity premium estimates across markets.
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We believe the dividend growth estimates are too high because g 5 is too high an estimate for the rate at which dividend growth can be sustained in perpetuity. To support this view, we document the extent of analyst optimism by comparing forecasted earnings with realized earnings (as reported by IBES), at different horizons. We compute the forecast error for each firm in our sample, representing the median consensus forecast as of the "sure disclosure date" less actual earnings, for different forecast horizons (year +1, +2, … +5) for each year between 1985 and 1997. Although the relation in equation (5) is a fifth-order polynomial in k, with five roots, in practice only one of the roots is reasonable. 12 The dividend growth estimates are very close to those reported in Khorana et al. (1997) , which uses a similar approach and a similar sample. 13 Regressions of monthly country index returns between January 1993 and March 1999 (both dollar-denominated and in local currency) on the Morgan Stanley World Index returns generated beta estimates close to 1.
forecasted earnings exceed actual earnings every year. 14 More important, the increase in that bias with the horizon indicates that the forecasted values of g 5 used to construct forecasts for years +3, +4 and +5 are biased upward. Note that the median forecast errors reported in this table mask considerable variation across time. In particular, there is a noticeable trend of declining optimism over time for all countries.
Since these forecast errors are scaled by price, they should be compared against prevailing earnings-to-price (E/P) ratios to gauge the magnitude of bias relative to reported earnings. The E/P ratios for these country-years ranged between 5 and 10 percent (they are much lower for Japan).
Comparing this E/P value with the forecast errors in Table IV , which vary between 0.2% percent for year +1 to around 3 percent for year +5, suggests that the optimistic growth forecasts cause five-year out earnings forecasts to exceed actual earnings by about 40 percent (3 percent forecast error relative to E/P values between 5 and 10 percent).
Comparing g 5 with expected inflation rates, proxied by g ae , provides an estimate of the implied real earnings growth rates forecast by analysts. The differences between the mean values of g 5 and g ae reported for each country suggest real dividend growth rates in perpetuity that range between 6.09% for Canada and 8.25% for Japan. These real rates exceed historic real earnings growth rates, and are at least twice as high as the real GDP growth rates forecast for these countries (of around two to three percent). Overall, we believe that g 5 is too high an estimate for g, and as a result k* and the related equity premium are also biased upward substantially.
While the optimism in analyst growth forecasts will also bias upward the equity premium estimate from the abnormal earnings approach, since the five abnormal earnings forecasts are optimistic, the net effect is smaller because the assumed growth in abnormal earnings beyond year +5 is determined independently of g 5 (g ae equals the expected inflation rate, or r f −3%). As mentioned in the Introduction, we do not adjust explicitly for optimism bias in analysts' earnings 14 IBES removes one-time items (typically negative) from reported earnings That is, the level of optimism would have been even higher if we had used reported numbers instead of actual earnings according to IBES.
forecasts because we are unable to determine accurately the extent of optimism. We note, however, that our estimates would be even lower if such an adjustment were made.
To illustrate how the abnormal earnings uses more available "hard" data (current book value and abnormal earnings for years +1 to +5) to reduce the emphasis on "soft" estimates (terminal value based on an assumed growth rate in abnormal earnings), we construct a value profile for the US for 1991. This year was selected because it represents a "median" profile.
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Recall from Table III , panel F, that our estimate for k for the US in 1991 is 11.05%, and r f is 8.04%. The terminal value is based on abnormal earnings growing at an anticipated inflation rate of 5.04% (g ae =r f of 8.04% less 3%). The value profile for the abnormal earnings model,
represented by the solid columns in Figure 1 , shows that approximately 50% of the total value is captured by current book value, 10 percent is spread over the abnormal earnings for the next five years, and only 40 percent remains in the terminal value.
The abnormal earnings profile can also be represented as a stream of dividends, shown by the hollow columns in Figure 1 . (Note that this profile of dividends relates to the abnormal earnings model and is different from that projected for the dividend growth model, where dividends are assumed to grow at 12.12%). Even though the abnormal earnings and dividend profiles correspond to the same underlying projections, the terminal value for the dividend profile represents almost 85 percent of total value. Not only is a larger fraction of total value captured by the terminal value for the dividend profile, the dividend growth rate assumed is hard to calibrate in isolation. Specifically, is the dividend growth rate of 5.6 percent, which corresponds to this terminal value, too high or too low? 16 And why is this rate more reasonable than the assumed dividend growth rate of 12.12 percent that underlies the dividend growth model estimate for the US in 1991? Note that switching from one dividend growth assumption to the other has a dramatic impact on the estimated discount rate (11.05% vs. 15.16%) and equity premium (3.01% vs. 7.12%).
In contrast, we have more confidence in the assumed abnormal earnings growth rate, and changes in this growth rate have a smaller impact on the estimated equity premium. We assume that accounting rents over the long-term are unlikely to grow at a rate much higher than the anticipated inflation rate of 5 percent. Even if this rate were doubled to 10 percent, a level that would require rents to grow at an unprecedented real rate of 5 percent in perpetuity, the equity premium increases by just over two percentage points. In fact, to obtain a market discount rate as high as 15.16 percent, corresponding to k*, abnormal earnings would have to grow at about 15 percent per year, representing a real rate of 10 percent. Such a high level of growth in perpetuity for rents is clearly unreasonable.
In sum, our estimates of the equity risk premium using the abnormal earnings approach are considerably lower than the Ibbotson rate, and we suspect that adjusting for analyst optimism would lower them further still. While our estimates from the dividend growth approach are much closer to the Ibbotson rate, we believe they are biased upward because the 5-year growth in forecast earnings is simply too high an estimate for dividend growth in perpetuity. The estimates from the abnormal earnings approach are more reliable because we use more available information to reduce sensitivity to variation in assumed growth rates, and are better able to reject growth rates as being infeasible by projecting rents rather than dividends.
IV Sensitivity Analyses
In a companion paper that focuses only on US equities, Claus and Thomas (1999), we conduct a battery of tests designed to gauge the robustness of our conclusion that the equity premium is much lower than 8%. We report here summaries of those findings and the results of repeating that analysis on the other five markets (details available upon request). Equation (4) can be manipulated algebraically (e.g, Penman, 1999) to obtain the following relation between price to book ratios and future profitability levels, measured by the excess of the accounting return on equity (roe) over the expected rate of return for the market, k. , is the accounting rate of return in year t, computed on book value of equity in t-1.
This relation indicates that the price-to-book (P/B) ratio is explained by future expected abnormal profitability (roe t -k). Markets expected to earn roe equal to k should trade currently at book values (p 0 /bv 0 =1), and if roe exceeds k, the P/B ratio should exceed 1. Similarly, the P/B ratios forecast for future years should correspond to the excess of roe over k forecast for the years after that future date. As argued earlier, factors such as global competition and pressure from other stakeholders should cause extreme profitability to revert to k; that is, country-years with roe much greater than k should exhibit a decline in that profitability over time. Consistent with this pattern in roe, P/B ratios that are predicted to be high for these cases should also decline subsequently.
We examine the validity of different assumed growth rates by projecting future prices, book values, and roe, and checking to see if the trends forecast for the P/B ratios and profitability follow a consistent pattern. Book values are projected as described in section II, using forecasted earnings and an assumed dividend payout rate of 50%, and prices are projected to grow at the estimated expected rate of return (k) less any dividends paid.
We find that the P/B ratio exceeds one for every country-year, and as predicted by equation (6), forecast roe in future years always exceeds the estimated equity cost of capital, k.
While there is heterogeneity in P/B ratios across markets and over time, there is a consistent positive relation between the P/B ratio and the excess of roe over k. The five-year out P/B ratios are also well-behaved. High current P/B ratios are associated with lower five-year out P/B ratios, indicating that profitability tends to converge toward the cost of capital in the long-term. And the level of the five-year out P/B ratios are positively related to the level of roe values projected beyond year +5. These results confirm the validity of our assumed growth rates for abnormal earnings and the resulting equity premium estimates, since there are no discrepancies among current and future P/B ratios and profitability estimates.
To provide an illustration of how this analysis allows a check on assumed growth rates, we consider again the data for the US in 1991 and contrast the profitability (roe) and P/B projections for the next 15 years for the abnormal earnings approach with those for the dividend growth approach, in Figure 2 . The profitability levels are marked off on the left scale, and P/B ratios are shown on the right scale. Recall that the market discount rates estimated for the abnormal earnings and dividend growth approaches are 11.05% (k) and 15.16% (k*) and the corresponding terminal growth rates for abnormal earnings and dividends are 5.04% and 12.12%.
Consistent with the descriptions above, the projections for the abnormal earnings method (indicated by bold lines) appear reasonable. The P/B ratio always exceeds one, but it trends down over time. Consistent with P/B exceeding one, the roe is always above the 11.05% cost of capital, and trends toward it after year +5. Note that the optimistic analyst forecasts cause roe projections to climb for years +1 through +5, but the subsequent decline in roe is caused by the moderating influence of our assumption that g ae equals the inflation rate.
The results for the dividend growth approach suggest that the estimated market discount rate and the assumed dividend growth rate are too high. The profitability (roe) is actually below the cost of equity of 15.16% (k*), for the first three years, even though the P/B ratio is greater than one. Thereafter, the profitability keeps increasing, to a level above 20% by year +15.
Neither the high level of profitability nor its increasing pattern are easily justified, especially when it is observed repeatedly for every year in our sample. Similarly, the increasing pattern for P/B, which is projected to increase from about 2 to about 3 by year +15 is hard to explain. These projections are, however, consistent with an estimated market discount rate that is too high.
Since near-term forecasts of profitability made by analysts are below this market discount rate, despite the optimism documented, future levels of profitability have to be unreasonably high to compensate.
The second relation we use to check our assumption regarding post-horizon growth in abnormal earnings is the forward price-to-earnings relation. As shown in Claus and Thomas (1999, Appendix B), forward P/E ratios are a function of the present value of future growth in abnormal earnings, multiplied by a capitalization factor (=1/k). This relation is presented below:
where ∆ae t = ae t -ae t-1 ,is the change in expected abnormal earnings over the prior year.
The P/E on the left-hand side deviates slightly from the traditional representation in the sense that a forward ratio is considered, not a trailing P/E ratio where prices are compared with current earnings. As a practical matter, the forward P/E ratio is slightly lower than the trailing P/E ratio. Unlike the P/B ratio in equation (6) which refers to the level of profitability, the P/E relation refers to growth in profitability (e.g., Penman, 1999) . As with the P/B ratio analysis, future prices, book values, and abnormal earnings are projected for different country-years and the patterns for P/E and growth in abnormal earnings are examined to confirm that they are consistent with equation (7) and past experience.
For our sample, the P/E ratio always exceeds the inverse of the discount rate and the growth in abnormal earnings is always positive, as predicted by equation (7). The higher the inverse discount rate, the higher the P/E ratio, and the ratio of the P/E ratio to the inverse discount rate is positively related to the predicted growth in future abnormal earnings. Finally, very high P/E ratios tend to revert to the mean, reflected by lower five-year out P/E ratios, and the growth in forecast abnormal earnings is decreased accordingly.
P/E ratios in year +5 are also all greater than the corresponding values of 1/k in all sample years. This is to be expected since a positive growth in abnormal earnings (equal to the expected inflation rate) is assumed for all country-years, except for a few years for Japan where the growth in abnormal earnings is set to zero. Overall, the P/E results are comforting, as they are consistent with the predictions of equation (7).
We consider next the effect of changing the assumed growth rate in abnormal earnings beyond year +5. To do this we consider two cases for g ae : 3% less and 3% more than the case analyzed so far (where g ae equals the expected inflation rate). Increasing (decreasing) the assumed value of g ae increases (decreases) the estimated required rate of return, k. As mentioned in the appendix, our assumed growth rate of g ae =r f -3% is higher than any rate assumed in the prior literature. Adding another three percent to the growth rate, which would require abnormal earnings to grow at a three percent real rate (similar to the GDP) is quite high, but still within the realm of feasible growth rates. Dropping 3 percent, as in the lower growth scenario, would be equivalent to assuming a very low nominal growth rate in abnormal earnings, and would be consistent with much of the prior literature on abnormal earnings.
For the higher assumed rate (g ae =r f ), the average equity premium over the years for each country increases by between one and two percent. That is, even for this high growth rate in abnormal earnings, the increase in the estimated equity premium is modest, and leaves it substantially below the traditional estimates of the equity premium. While increasing the growth rate increases the terminal value, it also reduces the present value of the terminal value because of the higher market discount rate it causes. For the lower growth rate assumption, g ae =r f -6%, the estimated average market equity premium for each country falls between one and two percent. In combination the results of these tests suggest that equity premium estimates based on abnormal earnings are relatively insensitive to large variations in the growth rate in abnormal earnings past year +5. Also, even when this growth rate assumption is raised to the upper limits of a reasonable range, the estimated risk premia remain substantially below the Ibbotson estimate.
To alleviate concerns about possible errors in our assumed abnormal earnings growth rate, we consider a synthetic market portfolio constructed to have no expected future abnormal earnings. 17 As described in equation (6), portfolios with P/B ratios equal to 1 should exhibit no abnormal earnings; i.e. the return on equity should on average equal the cost of equity. To construct portfolios with P/B equal to 1, we split all firms with available data in each marketyear into two groups: those with P/B above 1 and those with P/B less than 1. Equity market and book values for each group are then aggregated to determine the overall P/B ratio for each group.
The two groups are then assigned weights (that sum to 1), depending on the distance of their P/B ratios from 1, so that the weighted-average P/B for the synthetic market portfolio is 1. All current and forecast data for sample firms each year are then multiplied by the corresponding weights to obtain the data required to estimate k from equation (5). The last term in equation (5), representing the terminal value of abnormal earnings beyond year +5, is set to zero. Since this portfolio is expected to have zero abnormal earnings overall, it is unlikely to have any abnormal earnings past year +5.
Given that the level of P/B is often much greater than one, the number of firms with P/B less than one is often a small proportion of the sample in each country. As a result, less profitable firms, indicated by P/B ratios below 1, dominate the synthetic market portfolio. While this synthetic market is not similar to the actual market in many respects, it is similar along one important dimension: the weighted-average betas for the synthetic portfolios were close to 1 for each year of the sample.
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We find that the equity premium estimates from the synthetic market are similar to, but slightly lower than, those reported in Table III . This result is consistent with our conclusion that the analyst forecasts used in the abnormal earnings approach are probably optimistic and result in equity premium estimates that are biased upward slightly. 17 We thank Stephen Penman for suggesting this analysis. 18 We were able to estimate firm-level betas only for US firms.
V. Conclusion
Barring some notable exceptions (e.g, Siegel, 1992 and 1994 , Blanchard, 1993 , and Malkiel, 1996 , academic financial economists generally accept that the equity premium is around 8%, based on the performance of the US market since 1926. We claim that these estimates are too high for the period that we examine, and the equity premium is probably no more than three percent. Our claim is based on estimates of the equity premium obtained for six large equity markets, derived by subtracting the 10-year risk-free rate from the discount rate that equates current prices to forecasted future flows derived from IBES earnings forecasts. Growth rates in perpetuity for dividends and abnormal earnings need to be much higher than is plausible to justify equity premium estimates of about 8%. Not only are such growth rates substantially in excess of any reasonable forecasts of aggregate growth (e.g., GDP), the projected streams for various indicators, such as price-to-book and price-to-earnings ratios, are also internally contradictory and inconsistent with intuition and past experience.
We agree that the weight of the evidence provided by the historical performance of US stock markets since 1926 is considerable. Yet there are reasons to believe that this evidence is unreliable, because of concerns relating to survivor bias and time-variation in the equity premium. In addition to our results, most other available evidence also suggests that the equity premium is probably much lower than 8%. Historical evidence from other periods and other markets as well as surveys of investor beliefs suggest that the equity premium is much lower.
While projecting dividends to grow at earnings growth rates forecast by analysts provides equity premium estimates as high as 8%, we show that those growth forecasts exhibit substantial optimism bias and need to be adjusted downward. Overall, we believe that the commonly accepted equity premium estimates are just not supported by an analysis that compares current market prices with reasonable expectations of future flows for the markets and years that we examine.
Table I Number of companies in sample representing the market
The market consists of firms on the I/B/E/S Summary Files with earnings forecasts for years +1, +2, and a 5-year earnings growth estimate (g 5 ) as of the date of "sure disclosure of financial statement information." This date is determined by taking the month that corresponds to the fiscal year end for the majority of firms in a particular market and then adding the statutory period by which annual reports must be filed, plus one month. For example, in the United States the filing deadline is 3 months, and most firms have December fiscal year ends. Thus, for the United States, April is used as the sure disclosure date. In effect, April is the point each year when the year-end book values of equity reported as of that date are the least stale. For the remaining countries examined, the most common fiscal year end is December, except for Japan where March is the most common year-end, and the filing deadlines are: six months for Canada and the UK, four months for France, eight months for Germany, and three months for Japan. An additional filter imposed upon the data is that actual numbers such as book value, earnings, dividends, share price and shares outstanding must be available for the full fiscal year preceding the sure disclosure date. Also, we require that the total market capitalization of firms in our sample be at least 35% of the primary stock holdings for that country- ,559  86  118  1,613  87  136  1,774  88  141  70  80  1,735  89  110  78  28  35  1,809  90  100  99  102  47  1,889  91  73  115  103  640  96  1,939  92  72  85  104  701  211  2,106  93  73  143  98  689  219  2,386  94  85  98  99  690  214  2,784  95  97  157  99  472  98  2,965  96  75  170  114  124  204  3,360  97  99  152  114  161  275  3,797  98  119  160  111  374  3,673 Table II Descriptive Data: market and book values of equity, dividend payout ratios, and earnings
The market consists of firms in the IBES Summary Files with median earnings forecasts for years +1, +2, and 5-year earnings growth estimate (g 5 ) as of the "sure disclosure date" for each country (see Table I ). Actual share price, number of shares outstanding, and book values are as of the end of the prior fiscal year (year 0). Book values of equity are obtained from Compustat and Global Vantage for Canadian and US firms, and Datastream International for all other countries. All amounts are on a consolidated basis, and are in millions of home country currency. 910,123 52,292,410 43,804,295 17,707,820 6,289,760 2,670,725 96 214,687 122,878 2,256,427 1,350,071 692,968 306,079 91,457,231 43,251,899 60,206,066 26,434,037 8,207,274 3,182,952 97 402,871 146,965 2,760,566 1,332,254 1,048,315 372,620 117,671,463 51,513,864 82,114,524 29,654,641 10,198,036 3,679,110 98 484,529 165,634 4,695,845 1,657,278 120,706,611 32,692,096 113,796,832 32,805,791 12,908,495 3,412,303 The market is an aggregate of firms on the I/B/E/S Summary files with median earnings forecasts for years +1, +2, and a 5-year earnings growth estimate (g 5 ) as of the sure disclosure date for each country (see Table I ). k* is the expected rate of return or discount rate on the market under the dividend-growth model in equation (1) below. The five-year earnings growth estimate (g 5 ) is used to proxy for the dividend growth rate in perpetuity (g). k is the corresponding rate from the abnormal earnings approach that satisfies the valuation relation in equation (5) below. Abnormal earnings (ae t ) equal reported earnings less a charge for the cost of equity (=beginning book value of equity*k). Assuming a dividend payout of 50% of earnings allows the estimation of future book values from current book values and forecast earnings. The terminal value represents all abnormal earnings beyond year 5. Those abnormal earnings are assumed to grow at a constant growth rate g ae , which is assumed to equal the real risk free rate, and is set equal to the risk-free rate less 3% (or set equal to zero, if the risk-free rate is below 3%). All risk-free rates are 10-year rates, as of the sure disclosure date, and are obtained from Datastream. The following table represents the median of all forecast errors at different horizons scaled by share price for each year examined. The forecast error is calculated for each firm as of the "sure disclosure date" (see table I) each year, and equals the median consensus forecasted earnings per share minus the actual earnings per share, scaled by price. The first column lists the horizon of that forecast (i.e. an earnings forecast for one year in the future is listed is "Forecast Year +1."). For each forecast horizon, we report the median forecast error and the number of firm-years in the sample. To interpret the Table, Based on the data in Table III , Panel F, for the abnormal earnings approach, abnormal earnings are assumed to grow at 5.04%, the anticipated inflation rate, past year 5, and the resulting market discount rate (k) is 11.05%. For the abnormal earnings profile, the fractions represented by book value, abnormal earnings in years +1 through +5, and the terminal value are shown by the solid columns. For the dividend profile corresponding to those abnormal earnings projections, the fractions of current market capitalization that are represented by dividends in years +1 through +5 and the terminal value are shown by the hollow columns. Based on data in Table III , Panel F, for the dividend growth model, dividends are assumed to grow at the consensus five-year earnings growth rate of 12.12%, and future roe is compared with the estimated market discount rate of 15.16% (k*). For the abnormal earnings model, abnormal earnings are assumed to grow at an anticipated inflation rate of 5.04%, and roe is compared with the estimated market discount rate of 11.05% (k). The projected P/B ratios are also shown for both models. used as a proxy for g. We note that these proxies create additional error. First, it is important to hold the unit of investment constant through the period where growth is measured. In particular any growth created at the aggregate level by the issuance/retirement of new equity since the beginning of the period, should be ignored. Second, profits from all activities conducted outside the publicly-traded corporate sector that are include in the macroeconomic measures should be deleted, and all overseas profits relating to this sector that is excluded from the macroeconomic measure should be included.
Panel A: Market and Book Values of Equity
To mitigate these problems, we focus on growth in rents (abnormal earnings), g ae , and use forecasted per share earnings. To understand the benefits of switching to g ae , it is important to describe some features of abnormal earnings. Expected abnormal earnings would equal zero if book values of equity reflected market values. 20 If book values measure input costs fairly, but did not include the portion of market values that represented economic rents (not yet earned), abnormal earnings would reflect those rents and be expected to be positive. However, the magnitude of such rents at the aggregate market level is likely to be small, and any rents that emerge are likely to be dissipated over time for the usual reasons. As a result, much of the earlier literature utilizing the abnormal earnings approach has assumed zero growth in abnormal earnings past the "horizon" date.
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Returning to the two-firm example, shifting the focus from growth in dividends to growth in rents removes much of the confusion caused by transitory changes in dividend payouts and dividend yields: these factors should have no impact on growth in rents, since the magnitude and growth in rents are determined by economic factors such as monopoly power. That is, even though the two firms have different forecasted earnings and dividends, the forecasted abnormal earnings and growth in abnormal earnings should be identical. 20 That is, if market prices are efficient and book values are marked to market values each period, market (book) values are expected to adjust each period so that no abnormal returns (abnormal earnings) are expected in the future. 21 In fact, some papers are even more conservative: they have assumed that abnormal earnings decline past the horizon date, to a level of zero.
We believe, however, that the popular assumption of zero growth in abnormal earnings is too pessimistic because accounting statements are conservative and understate input costs: assets (liabilities) tend to be understated (overstated) on average. For example, many investments (such as research and development, advertising, and purchased intangibles) are written off too rapidly in many domiciles. As a result, abnormal earnings tend to be positive, even in the absence of economic rents. Growth in abnormal earnings under conservative accounting is best understood by examining the behavior of the excess of roe, the accounting rate of return on the book value of over k (the discount rate). Simulations and theoretical analyses (e.g., Zhang, 1997) of the steady-state behavior of the accounting rate of return under conservative accounting suggest two important determinants: the long-term growth in investment and the degree of accounting conservatism. These analyses also suggest that roe approaches k, but remains above it in the long-term.
Even though a decline in the excess of roe over k should cause the magnitude of abnormal earnings to fall over time, a countervailing factor is the growth in investment, which increases the base on which abnormal earnings are generated. We assume as a first approximation that the latter effect is greater than the former, and that abnormal earnings increase in perpetuity at the expected inflation rate. Since we recognize that this approximation is ad hoc, we elected to err on the side of choosing too high a growth rate, to ensure that our equity premium estimates were not biased downward. Also, we conduct sensitivity analyses to examine the impact of changing this assumed growth rate.
